Title:  Core Stability of Flow Games

Speaker: Xiaoxun SUN
Ocean University

Date: Friday Nov 24, 2006
Time 3-4PM
Venue: Room 3584, HKUST

  
Abstract:
In this paper, we study the problem of core stability for flow games, 
introduced by Kalai and Zemel (1982), which arises from the profit 
distribution problem related to the maximum flow in networks. Based 
on the characterization of dummy arc (i.e., the arc which satisfies 
that deleting it does not change the value of maximum flow in the 
network), we prove that the flow game defined on a simple network 
has the stable core if and only if there is no dummy arc in the 
network. We also show that the core largeness, the extendability 
and the exactness of flow games are equivalent conditions, 
which strictly imply the stability of the core.

This is joint work with Qizhi FANG